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Abstract
the history of European union company law is a very troubled one. it is a history of 
national conflicts and debates which resulted in the inability of the EU to create a 
common body of Eu company law. the article will argue that national company laws 
are deeply rooted in national culture. Corporate governance in particular evolved into 
an arena where fierce corporate culture wars were fought for decades. This is why the 
European Company -the so-called societas Europea- failed to evolve into a truly 
supranational corporate form. While all member states have their own distinctive 
systems of corporate governance, the failure in question has been mostly fuelled by 
the conflict between the two widely-opposed corporate governance systems of the 
uK and Germany. the uK endorses the so-called contractual model of corporate 
governance. Germany on the other hand employs the so-called stakeholder system of 
corporate governance. the rest of the member states of the Eu lie between those two 
opposing poles. The conflict between the two European pillars of widely opposed 
corporate philosophies and consequently laws –the uK and Germany- has been so 
intense that it undermined any attempt to create a single European company. the 
article argues that Brexit can change that. the exit of one of the two main pillars of 
the conflict may pave the way for the dominance of the stakeholder model of corpo-
rate governance in the EU. A post-Brexit EU would lack the most vocal and influen-
tial supporter of contractualism. this should allow the remaining member states to 
converge into a standard that would be closer to the stakeholder model.
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Introduction
the history of European union company law is a very troubled one. it is a history of 
national conflicts and debates which resulted in the inability of the EU to create a 
common body of Eu company law. While several aspects of company law have been 
harmonised to an extent, the failure of the Eu to agree on a common form of corpo-
rate governance or a single European Company has been spectacular. a single “Euro-
pean Company” form is important for the smooth operation of the single market. it 
would greatly facilitate cross-border investment as investors would only have to look 
at one set of legislation instead of the current 28 different sets of national legislation. 
It would significantly enhance legal certainty as there would be clarity regarding the 
rules applicable to the establishment of a European Company in every member state 
of the Eu. it would remove many regulatory as well as practical obstacles allowing 
every company or Eu national to engage in cross-border business activities and 
expand to another member state of the Eu without having to face a complex set of 
national rules. in simple words, the introduction of a truly European Company would 
complement the single market and it would enhance its operation.
While all member states have their own distinctive systems of corporate gover-
nance, the failure in question has been mostly fuelled by the conflict between the two 
widely-opposed corporate governance systems of the uK and Germany. these two 
jurisdictions have effectively evolved into the two pillars of the conflict. The UK 
endorses the so-called contractual model of corporate governance. this entails a pub-
lic company with a mostly dispersed shareholding basis, where the shareholders are 
viewed as the exclusive members and the owners of the company. the uK regulatory 
framework leaves no place for stakeholders into the institutional architecture of its 
companies. Germany on the other hand employs the so-called stakeholder system of 
corporate governance. its public companies have a more concentrated shareholding 
basis as a result of an increased role granted to banks as a source of capital for the 
company. in many instances the company is managed by a dual-board where share-
holders and stakeholders assume executive and monitoring roles. the rest of the 
member states of the Eu lie between those two opposing poles. they employ -with 
variations- the so-called stakeholder model, which endorses a corporate form which 
may not always entail a dual-board management, but it does involve a more inclusive 
corporate form which views the stakeholders as intrinsically linked with the company. 
The conflict between the two European pillars of widely opposed corporate philoso-
phies and consequently laws –the uK and Germany- has been so intense that it under-
mined any attempt to create a single harmonised body of Eu company law. it 
prevented the Eu from creating a single European company.
the article argues that Brexit can change that. the exit of one of the two main pil-
lars of the conflict may pave the way for the dominance of the stakeholder model of 
corporate governance in the Eu. the remaining 27 members do not employ an iden-
tical system of corporate governance and differences would certainly continue to exist. 
But their national laws are based on relatively similar ideologies of stakeholder-
friendly nature, which can justify optimism that convergence into a single European 
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corporate form would be attainable within the next decade. a post-Brexit Eu would 
lack the most vocal and influential supporter of contractualism. This should allow the 
remaining member states to converge into a standard that would be closer to the 
stakeholder model. the departure of the uK may allow the rest of the member states 
to negotiate and agree on a corporate form which would bridge the differences 
between their own respective corporate models. the negotiation in question would 
embark on a wholly different basis than previously. While it was impossible to con-
verge the contractual and the stakeholder models of corporate governance into a 
single one, it is argued that it would be easier to find a middle way between the 
stakeholder-friendly models employed by the 27 Eu members. the ideology behind 
the variations of this system is based on very similar philosophical and societal values 
which render convergence much more attainable.
the article will argue that national company laws are deeply rooted in national 
culture. Corporate governance in particular evolved into an arena where fierce cor-
porate culture wars were fought for decades. the article will focus on the uK and 
Germany as the main pillars of the debate. it will examine the historical, philosophi-
cal and legal background of their regulatory choices and it will argue that the relevant 
cultural conflicts rendered any convergence into a single system of European Union 
corporate governance impossible. this is why the European Company -the so-called 
societas Europea- failed to evolve into a truly supranational corporate form. the 
article will then look at Brexit and it will argue that the departure of one of the two 
pillars of the debate will significantly change the EU company law landscape. It will 
argue that Brexit will probably provide a great impetus for convergence at the Eu 
level and that the prospect of a single European company will become very realistic. 
the article will conclude that Brexit will decisively tip the balance towards a stake-
holder model of corporate governance. this may be the time that a truly Eu company 
law may be born. the company that is now only nominally a “European Company” 
may indeed be truly European within the next decade.
The Restraints Posed by National Cultures on EU Company Law
Culture is a complex construct whose precise scope and definition may be hard to 
agree upon. it is viewed as “an integrated pattern of basic assumptions, values and 
artefacts that set the stage for action, belief and policy”.1 it is a social phenomenon 
which involves beliefs, art, morals, laws, customs as well as “symbolic and learnt 
aspects of human society”.2 Cultural anthropologists defined it as a “conscience cre-
ation of human rationality”.3 While it may be difficult for everyone to consent to a 
1 WC Frederick, Values, Nature and Culture in the American Corporation, 88 (oxford university 
Press, oxford, 1995).
2 Angus Young, Rethinking the Fundamentals of Corporate Governance: The Relevance of Culture 
in the Global Age 29 Company Lawyer 172 (2008).
3 John Scott, Gordon Marshall, Oxford Dictionary of Sociology, 133 (oxford: ouP 2005). 
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common definition of “culture”, there is consensus that the concept in question entails 
the existence of shared values, a system of common beliefs and set of common behav-
ioural norms.4 Values stand at the foundations of culture as they shape attitudes and 
pave the way for actions, policies and strategies on the part of the state that sees itself 
as the bearer of these values.5 Friedman argued that “cultural factors are an essential 
ingredient in turning a static structure and a static collection of norms into a body of 
living law”.6 Therefore, institutions and laws reflect the prevailing cultural values.7
Corporate governance in particular is a by-product of the values prevailing in each 
country. the uK system of corporate governance is shareholder and market-centric.8 
it is based on the values of liberty, economic liberalism, property rights and indi-
vidualism as defined within the British cultural context. The German system of cor-
porate governance on the other hand is stakeholder-centric recognising both an 
institutional role for stakeholders but also their vested interest in the company.9 it 
embodies the values of collectivism, inclusivity, stability and social cohesion as 
defined within the German cultural context. It does not come as a surprise that when 
this attempt was made to converge these set of values into a single system of corporate 
governance, the whole project ended in failure. therefore, the failure to harmonise 
corporate governance is due to the “legal and cultural determinism proper to gover-
nance systems”.10 the failure to converge into a single system of corporate gover-
nance at the EU level has undermined the whole edifice of EU company law. This is 
not a new phenomenon. it has deep roots that have been explained since the 18th 
century by the great philosopher Montesquieu.11 institutional, cultural and social fac-
tors are determinants of the nature of governance as they define the context within 
which the later is taking its shape.12
although the Eu aims at forging common regulatory standards which are neces-
sary for the smooth operation of its internal market, national culture emerged as such 
a strong determinant of corporate governance that preserved diversity of corporate 
4 PJ Kotter, J.L Heskett, Organisational Culture and Performance (Free Press, New York, 1992).
5 JW Salacuse, Corporate Governance, Culture and Convergence: Corporations American Style or 
with a European touch 9 Law and Business review of the americas 33-62 (2003). 
6 Lawrence Friedman, Law and Society, 76 (Prentice hall, 1977).
7 S Schwartz, H Shalom, A Theory Of Cultural Value Difference: Some Implications for Work 48 
applied Psychology 23 (1999). 
8 Shabir Ahmad, Rosmini Omar, Basic Corporate Governance Models: A Systematic Review 58 
International Journal of Law and Management 76 (2016).
9 See Gregory Francesco Maasen, An International Comparison of Corporate Governance Models 
(spencerstuart, third Edition, amsterdam, 1999). 
10 Veronique Magnier, Comparative Corporate Governance, Legal Perspectives, 6 (Edward Elgar, 
2017).
11 Charles-Louis Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, (1748). see: <https://archive.org/details/spiri-
toflaws01montuoft>. 
12 R Gill, Law, Culture and Corporate Governance: Insights from Executive Compensation, Cana-
dian Law and Economics association annual conference, toronto, september 2012. see: <https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2164532>. 
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governance rules, norms and principles.13 the Eu managed to harmonise various 
aspects of the wider commercial law field such as competition law to a great extent. 
the failure to harmonise corporate governance –and consequently of company law 
to a great extent- is due to history, philosophy, the existence of divergent national 
economic models and at the end it is due to the distinctive culture and identity of each 
member state. This is because national corporate governance “reflects public policy 
choices”.14 Each country’s company law has developed according to the societies’ 
own culture and consequently companies incorporated under different national laws 
often have less in common than one would be inclined to think,15 because “the centre 
of gravity of legal development lies not in legislation nor in juristic science nor in 
judicial decision but in society itself”.16 The relevant legislation profoundly influences 
the priorities of firms, the nature of the employment relationship as well as the rela-
tions with the creditors and the suppliers. therefore, corporate governance entails the 
regulation of matters which are of paramount importance for a society. the nature of 
these regulations can only reflect the prevailing cultural principles and societal values 
of the country in question.
The widely varying conceptions of “company” in different societies17 explain why 
company law is not a purely technical form of regulation; it is intrinsically linked 
with the dominant social trends, notions and beliefs and it forms a part of law. the 
different national models of company law in the EU reflect differences in underlying 
economic conditions and in public policy considerations past and present.18 it is 
interesting to note that it has been argued that culture functioned as “an antidote to 
convergence of corporate governance regulation”.19 Corporate governance found 
itself at the very centre of a debate that involves the very cultural identity and basic 
political choices made on the part of societies. the reason behind the debate that has 
generated academic articles and books,20 a very lively exchange of ideas on the part 
13 Ajomboh Rachael Ntongho, Culture and Corporate Governance Convergence 58 international 
Journal of Law and Management 535 (2016).
14 P Peter,A Gourevich and J Shinn, Political Power and Control: The New Global Politics of 
Corporate Governance, 3 (Princeton University Press, New Jersey 2005).
15 Yavasi Mahmut, Shareholding and Board Structures of German and UK Companies 22 Com-
pany Lawyer 47 (2001).
16 E Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of Sociology of Law, 14 (harvard university Press, Cam-
bridge Ma, 1936).
17 Janice Dean, Directors’ Duties in Response to Hostile Takeover Bids 14 international Company 
and Commercial Law review 370 (2003).
18 Ulf Bernitz, Wolf-George Ringe, Company Law and Economic Protectionism, New Challenges 
to European Integration, 191 (Oxford University Press, 2010), B Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, 
Structure and Operation (Clarendon, oxford, 1997) arguing the opposite, 
19 Ajomboh Rachael Ntongho, Culture and Corporate Governance Convergence 58 international 
Journal of Law and Management 535 (2016).
20 AC Riley, Understanding and Regulating the Corporation 58(4) Modern Law review 595 
(1995); JF Stiglitz, Multinational Corporations: Balancing Rights and Responsibilities 101 Proceed-
ings of the annual Meeting (american society of international Law 2007), d attenborough, Giving 
Purpose to the Corporate Purpose Debate: An Equitable Maximisation and Viability Principle 32(1) 
Legal Studies 4. JE Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company 
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of politicians, industry and society and a rather overt confrontation between important 
parts of the society such as the employees, industry and the employers is the fact that 
corporate governance requires the effective engagement of actors that lie at the heart 
of the most important issues for a society. it is no coincidence that the Eu has passed 
mostly directives to harmonise company law within its context; this is not the case 
with competition law where a regulation has provided us with legal clarity and a uni-
fied approach across the EU.21 Directives by definition allow for a wide scope of 
discretion providing the member states with the liberty to leave their national models 
relatively immune to far-reaching harmonisation. the directive on the involvement 
of employees in the sE (European Company)22 is an example of this approach. it 
allowed both the UK and Germany to maintain their widely different models of 
employee participation in the corporate management. this is explained in detail at 
the final part of the article.
recently many scholars have said that a convergence of corporate governance is 
inevitable.23 it has been argued that corporate governance systems are subject to an 
irreversible process of convergence to the degree that we should be talking about “the 
end of history for corporate law”.24 this could be true up to an extent, but like Mark 
twain said “the report of my death was an exaggeration”.25 although there is some 
convergence, national law of corporate governance is thriving. this is because, as 
this article argues, corporate governance resisted the forces of full harmonisation even 
at the Eu level. When scholars assessed the development of company law in the Eu 
a few decades ago, no one seemed to doubt its centrality in the making of an integrated 
European market both economically and politically.26 What began with hopes for 
harmonised and unified company law rules across the EU, ended up with long legis-
lative instruments like the regulation on the societas Europea,27 the success of which 
was prevented by “national resistance politics”.28 Even after the multi-year intense 
Law, 237 (Clarendon Press, 1993). andrew Keay, The Corporate Objective (Edward Elgar, 2011). 
B Cheffins, Company Law : Theory, Structure and Operation, 1999 (Clarendon Press, 1997), s Bot-
tomley, The Constitutional Corporation (ashgate, 2007). 
21 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules 
on competition laid down in articles 81 and 82 of the treaty.
22 Directive 2001/86/EC supplementing the Statute for a European Company with regard to the 
involvement of employees.
23 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, harvard Law 
School John M Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series. Paper 280 
(2000). 
24 Ibid. but see a powerful contra argument by andrew Keay, The Corporate Objective, above.
25 Mark Twain, The Complete Interviews, 121 (Edited by Gary scharnhorst, the university of 
alabama Press, 2006).
26 William Lazonick, Varieties of Capitalism and Innovative Enterprise 24 Comparative social 
research 21 (2007).
27 Regulation on the Statute for a European Company (SE) EC 2157/2001.
28 Peer Zumbansen, Varieties of Capitalism and the Learning Firm: Corporate Governance and 
Labour in the Context of Contemporary Developments in European and German Company Law 8 Euro-
pean Business organisation Law review 486 (2007).
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efforts to harmonise company law in the EU, “little progress”29 has been made in the 
direction of company law uniformity in the Eu.
to consider corporate governance is also to consider competing models of capital-
ism and competing global economic models. it is therefore, important to shed light 
on the historical, socio-economic and legal developments which have contributed to 
national variation.30 National corporate governance “reflects public policy choices”.31 
Within the EU variation is attributed to the fight between a contractarian model of 
company law and corporate government championed by the uK and a stakeholder-
inclusive model of company law and corporate governance pioneered mostly by 
Germany but in different forms by most countries of continental Europe. The conflict 
in question reveals deeply rooted philosophical differences which touch the core of a 
nation’s identity and proved to be irreconcilable in designing an Eu company law. 
in continental Europe where the state plays a more active role in economic policy 
both corporate governance but also labour law favour more collectivist value systems32 
than in the uK.
the company has been one of the most “prominent units of analysis for understand-
ing modern economic growth”.33 Companies as a social institution are the outcomes 
of the social consensus reached in a given jurisdiction but at the same time they act 
as factors which influence it. The corporation is one of the most successful socioeco-
nomic institutions of modern society.34 apart from culture itself, the diversity of the 
corporate governance systems can be also attributed to the different set of legal sys-
tems in place35 such as common law and civil law.36 the ‘ownership’ structure –as 
it will be thoroughly explained later- is a key feature that determines the nature of a 
corporate governance system. the dispersed nature of the shareholding of the uK 
companies creates a very different set of challenges compared to the rather concen-
trated nature of ownership of companies in Germany. Other important influences on 
a corporate governance system include the regulation of the financial and capital 
markets, labour law, bankruptcy laws and the banking system. that is partly the rea-
son why introducing a reform of corporate governance is such a complicated and 
highly politicised issue of the utmost sensitivity for many parties. it involves the 
reform of company law, but it also entails changes in labour law, tax law and financial 
29 Luca Enriques, in 66 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 763 (2017).
30 Zumbansen supra n28 at page 474.
31 P Peter,A Gourevich and J Shinn, Political Power and Control: The New Global Politics of 
Corporate Governance, 3 (Princeton University Press, New Jersey 2005).
32 Veronique Magnier, Comparative Corporate Governance, Legal Perspectives, 43 (Edward Elgar, 
2017).
33 Franco Amatori, Andrea Colli, Business History, Complexities and Comparisons, 10 (2011).
34 Roger M Barker, Corporate Governance, Competition and Political Parties, Explaining Corpo-
rate Governance Change in Europe, 3 (oxford university Press, 2010).
35 John C Coffee, Jr, The Future of History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate 
Governance and its Implications 93 Nwu Law review 641 (1999).
36 Mark J Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance 91 Columbia Law review 10 
(1991), alan dignam and Michael Galanis, The Globalisation of Corporate Governance (ashgate, 
2009).
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regulation. Even though, capital markets are gradually globalising, company laws 
remain distinctively national.37 Changing the law ordinarily requires political con-
sensus38 not only between shareholders and stakeholders, but it also entails a cultural 
change. this is a challenging task at national level; it proved to be an impossible task 
at the Eu level.
The United Kingdom: The Kingdom of Shareholders
the uK is the most vocal proponent of the contractual model of corporate governance 
in the Eu. that entails companies where shareholders enjoy -at least legally- absolute 
dominance; this is the principle of “shareholder supremacy”.39 there is a single board 
of directors, a usually dispersed shareholding basis and the shareholders are the 
ex clusive members of the company. other stakeholders are externalities with no say-
ing in corporate affairs.40 stakeholders are viewed as the “groups without whose sup-
port the organisation would cease to exist”41 such as shareholders and employees. 
Such an inclusive definition of the corporation comes into conflict with the perception 
of the corporate phenomenon in the uK, where the company comprises only the 
shareholders. this is a core principle of the nexus42 of contracts theory43 which defines 
the nature of the uK company.44 in the uK so “much ideology is spent on commit-
ment to shareholder interests”.45 it is “a fact that narrow contractarian models of the 
corporation have dominated academic thinking in the uK.”46 according to the nexus 
of contracts theory, the company is simply a network of contracts renegotiated by the 
individuals involved in it -the shareholders- with the principal aim of maximising 
their own profits and utility47 as well as the market value of the company through 
37 L Van de Berghe, Corporate Governance in a Globalising World: Convergence or Divergence? 
A European Perspective (Kluwer academic Publishers, amsterdam, 2002). 
38 Jeffrey N Gordon, Mark J Roe, Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance, 3 (Cam-
bridge university Press, 2004).
39 William W Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn 26 Journal of Cor-
porate Law 761 (2001).
40 See Janet Dine, Marios Koutsias, Company Law (Palgrave McMillan, 2012). 
41 R Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, 32 (Pitman Publishing, Boston, 
1984).
42 M Jensen and W Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Own-
ership Structure 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305 (1976); Fama (1980).
43 F Easterbrook, D Fischel, The Corporate Contract 89 Columbia Law review 1428 (1989).
44 This does not mean that the application of the theory in the UK company law has not been criti-
cised. see: Marios Koutsias, Shareholder Supremacy in a Nexus of Contracts: A Nexus of Problems 38 
Business Law review (2017).
45 V Dihn, Codetermination and Corporate Governance in a Multinational Business Enterprise 24 
Journal of Corporation Law 983 (1999).
46 Roman Tomasic, Folarin Akin bami, Towards a New Corporate Governance after the Global 
Financial Crisis 22 international Company and Commercial Law review 247 (2011).
47 A Alchian and H Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic Organisation 62 ameri-
can Economic Review 777 (1972) and see Cheffins (1997).
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‘allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency’.48 therefore, companies are ‘simply 
legal fictions which serve as a nexus of contracting relationships among individuals’.49 
They are an exclusively private affair devoid of social considerations. Friedman 
argued that the only responsibility of managers was to make money for shareholders.50 
adam smith’s The Wealth of Nations presents humans as driven by natural desire 
from self-improvement, which under conditions of free competition leads them “as 
if an invisible hand” to promote the public well-being.51
They consist of many ‘different kinds of relations that are worked out by those 
voluntarily associating in a company’52 and they form ‘the substance of the corporate 
fiduciary duty’.53 Each company in the uK has articles which form the constitution 
of the company.54 the articles of association constitute a contract not merely between 
the shareholders and the company, but between each individual shareholder and every 
other .55 The definition of the company as a collection of private contractual relation-
ships56 is quite consistent with the dominance of individualism within company law. 
Such ideology encourages laissez-faire principles as “corporate property was to be 
treated as private property demanding minimum government interference as this leads 
to inefficient allocation of capital”.57 it should be left intact from regulatory interfer-
ence which would place limitations upon the right to use the free enterprise tool as 
shaped exclusively by its signatory parties and members; the shareholders.
in a stakeholder-friendly company, a wide variety of interests must ordinarily be 
taken into account when pursuing the interests of the company.58 the new section 
172 of the Companies act 2006 –the fundamental duty of directors in the uK-59 has 
a more stakeholder-friendly terminology in the sense that it requires directors when 
48 C Mayer, Corporate Governance, Competition and Performance 24 Journal of Law and Society 
152, 155 (1997).
49 M Jensen and W Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Own-
ership Structure 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305 (1976); Fama (1980), p 310.
50 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Improve Its Profits, New York 
times, 13 september 1970.
51 A Smith, The Wealth of Nations (Prometheus Books, New York 1991), originally published in 
1776.
52 Easterbrook and Fischel, The Corporate Contract above, p 1426.
53 T Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary 
Duty 98 Michigan Law review 214 (1999), p 217.
54 Section 17, Companies Act 2006.
55 Wood v. Odessa Waterworks (1889) 42 Ch d 636.
56 E Fama., Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm 88 Journal of Political Economy 288 
(1980), p 290.
57 S Kiarie, At Crossroads: Shareholder Value, Stakeholder Value And Enlightened Shareholder 
Value: Which Road Should the United Kingdom Take?, international Company and Commercial Law 
review 330 (2006).
58 Elaine Sternberg, The Defects of the Stakeholder Doctrines in Corporate Governance: Account-
ability in the Market Place, chapter 6: (Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 2004).
59 See: Shepherds Investments Ltd v. Walters [2006] EWhC 836.
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acting in good faith60 and in the way that they61 -reasonably-62 consider to be in the 
best interests of the company63 to have regard to stakeholders’ interests. however, 
section 172 lacks an enforcement mechanism. the Confederation of British industry 
rightly stated that directors in the uK are “responsible for relations with stakeholders; 
but they are accountable to the shareholders”.64 the uK’s Company Law review 
steering Committee stated that the “ultimate objective of companies … – i.e. to gen-
erate maximum value for shareholders is in principle the best means also of securing 
overall prosperity and welfare”.65 in this sense it appears that despite the “new” sec-
tion 172, the previous case law is still in force.66
Liberty and Property Rights in the English Context
As it is always the case, the nature and definition of these principles are a by-product 
of the distinctive historical developments which took place in the country over a long 
period of time. the common law became strongly associated with the idea of eco-
nomic freedom and the subject’s liberty from arbitrary action by the Crown67 from a 
very early stage. Magna Carta placed ‘individual liberties above all others except 
communal rights”68 a concept adopted by English common law in the thirteenth cen-
tury. In 1361 the English Justices of the Peace Act provided for the arrest of peeping 
toms and eavesdroppers. From the beginning the intent to protect an individual from 
the government was clear: “the poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all 
force of the Crown. it may be frail … the rain may enter; but the King of England 
cannot enter.69 this position highlights vividly the prominent position that liberty 
assumed in the English legal order from a very early point of history. it is translated 
into the right of any individual to define a space which should be respected by anyone 
including the highest authority. the underlining concept of liberty was the right 
to personal property. Liberty is a sacrosanct right which allows an individual to exer-
cise his activities without any intervention within a space where he can exercise his 
60 Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch. 304.
61 Extrasure Travel Insurance Ltd v. Scattergood [2003] 1 BCLC 598.
62 Item Software (UK) Ltd v. Fassibi [2004] EWCa Civ 1244; [2005] 2 BCLC 91.
63 Regentcress plc v. Coben [2002] 2 BCLC 80.
64 Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance (1998), para. 1.17. see it at: <http://www.
ecgi.org/codes/documents/hampel.pdf>.
65 Company Law Review, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Strategic Frame-
work, para. 5.1.12. (London, dti, 1999).
66 See: Re West Coast Capital (LIOS) Ltd [2008] Csoh 72 and Cobden Investments Ltd v. RWM 
Langport Ltd [2008] EWhC 2810 (Ch).
67 PG Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right 30 Journal of 
Legal studies 508 (2001).
68 BR Bale, Informed Lending Decision v. Privacy Interests in Great Britain 10 transnational 
Lawyer 77 (1997).
69 BL Cardonsky, Towards a Meaningful Right to Privacy in the United Kingdom 20 Boston uni-
versity International Law Journal 396 (2002).
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 authority. therefore, the links between the right to property and liberty highlight the 
importance of the former within the English legal culture.70
in the corporate governance context, “ownership” entails the legal allocation of 
property rights to shareholders and “controls” the ways legal rules shape the balance 
of power among them.71 the notion of ownership that is dominant in the English 
company law stems from partnership. By the early 18th century, small partnerships 
were the preferred tool to conduct business and trade in England. these companies 
were not incorporated, and a mere collection of individuals constituted and owned 
the entity.72 the owners of the partnerships were also providing the funding for the 
enterprise. rapid technological developments necessitated increased funding for the 
expansion of the existing enterprises if they were to embrace novel methods of pro-
duction. these developments led to the unincorporated company, a form of partner-
ship where some members would run the company and others, usually landowners or 
successful traders, would provide the capital. the partnerships were marked by abso-
lute shareholder primacy; the shareholders were the “owners” of the entity. at that 
point, shareholder primacy was reflected at all levels of corporate activities and share-
holders clearly enjoyed rights which were normally attributed to the owners of an 
object, in complete contrast to now. at that point every shareholder could block col-
lective decisions. Partnerships reached decisions through the unanimity rule based on 
the one partner, one vote system.73 While nowadays any property right of sharehold-
ers on the company is contested by many scholars,74 the doctrine in question is still 
dominant within the English company law and theory. the philosophy of absolute 
shareholder dominance was clearly reflected by the Joint Stock Companies Bill of 
185675 which was introduced in the house of Commons by Mr robert Lowe, the 
Vice President of the English Board of trade.76 it was based on the principle that the 
company ought to pursue the best interest of its shareholders even if it has to act con-
trary to broader social interests.77
British companies operate in practice with a single board. directors owe their 
duties to the legal person ‘the company’.78 the company is the only person with the 
70 See Marios Koutsias, The Fallacy of Property Rights’ Rhetoric in the Company Law Context: 
From Shareholder Exclusivity to the Erosion of Shareholders’ Rights 28 international Company and 
Commercial Law review 217 (2017).
71 S Wen, Shareholder Primacy and Corporate Governance, 13 (abingdon: routledge, 2013).
72 FB Palmer, Company Law, 134 (London: sweet and Maxwell, 1968).
73 A Rahmani, Shareholder Control and its Nemesis i.C.C.L.r. 13 [2012].
74 See Marios Koutsias, The Fallacy of Property Rights’ Rhetoric in the Company Law Context: 
From Shareholder Exclusivity to the Erosion of Shareholders’ Rights 28 international Company and 
Commercial Law review 217 (2017).
75 See: Hansard Vole 140, cols 124, 130,131. 1856.
76 Joseph E.O Abugu, Primacy of Shareholders’ Interests and the Relevance of Stakeholder Eco-
nomic Theories, Company Lawyer 202 (2013). 
77 See: Rob McQueen, A Social History of Modern Company Law: Great Britain and the Australian 
Colonies 1854-1920 (ashgate, 2009). 
78 Section 172 Companies Act 2006.
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capacity to raise an action against a director.79 only in exceptional circumstances 
can a shareholder act independently but still on behalf of the company with a deriva-
tive action. the shareholders enjoy the exclusive privilege of membership. they are 
the only insiders to the company as opposed to the other actors such as employees or 
creditors who are considered as externalities. therefore, theoretically at least the 
shareholders are the ones who can convince or force the legal person (the company) 
to sue the management in case of abuse. the board would normally include non-
executive or independent directors whose roles would be to monitor the executive 
ones.80
British companies usually have a dispersed shareholding basis as they take their 
capital mostly from the securities’ markets. When they sell their shares to the public 
they attract potentially millions of new members; private individuals or institutional 
shareholders. this is a distinctive feature of the “outsider” model of corporate gov-
ernance.81 this is dominant in the uK and other commonwealth countries which 
resort to the stock market for the capitalisation of their companies. scholars consider 
the outsider system of corporate governance an aspect of “liberal market economies”.82 
outsider systems –at least theoretically- emphasise “competitive market exchange 
where actors structure their interaction through arm’s length bargaining and formal 
contracts funded by significant capital markets”.83 the “insider” corporate gover-
nance systems are those marked by a more concentrated shareholding basis with the 
most prominent examples being the German corporate governance system and to a 
certain degree other continental European countries; those economies are marked as 
“co-ordinated market economies”.84 the insider systems facilitate non market 
exchange, reliance on networks, the exchange of private information inside these 
networks and more reliance on collaborative as opposed to competitive relationships 
to build the competencies of the firm.85 the Europeans emphasise cooperative rela-
tionships and reaching consensus,86 while in the uK the emphasis is on competition 
and market processes.87
79 Janet Dine, Marios Koutsias, Company Law (Palgrave McMillan, 2012).
80 Ibid. 
81 Thomas Clarke, International Corporate Governance, A Comparative Approach, 186 (routledge, 
New York, 2017).
82 D Soskice and P Hall, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative 
Advantage (oxford university Press, 2001).
83 Alan Dignam and Michael Galanis, Corporate Governance and the Importance of Macroeco-
nomic Context 28 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 215 (2008).
84 D Soskice and P Hall, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative 
Advantage (oxford university Press, 2001).
85 M Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control 53 stanford 
Law review 539 (2000).
86 Thomas Clarke, International Corporate Governance, A Comparative Approach, 251 (routledge, 
New York, 2017).
87 S Nestor S JKThomson, Corporate Governance Patterns in OECD Economies: Is Convergence 
Under Way? discussion Paper, Paris (oECd, 2000). see: <https://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corpo-
rategovernanceprinciples/1931460.pdf>. 
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The German Company: Enter Stakeholders
Germany has a long and interesting history of company law. the German corporate 
governance system is the product of the country’s long history, politics and economy 
as well as of its culture.88 the article will focus mainly on the post-war era when 
modern German company law took its final shape within the context of the simultane-
ous development of the Eu but, it will also shed light on the main actors which were 
critical in the evolution and shaping of the current German corporate governance 
model. the cartelisation and the cross-shareholdings and links between German com-
panies, the traditional role of banks as capital providers and the landmark-feature of 
the German corporate architecture – the dual board- will be examined next.
a distinctive feature of the early phase of industrialisation in Germany was the 
wide-scale operation of cartels involving companies, banks and the state. German 
business thus, showed a tendency towards large scale and vertical integration as well 
as towards the extensive use of professional managers.89 Germany was the home of 
industrial combination in Europe with closely knit business, government and banks.90 
other countries were not immune to cartelisation, but Germany avoided tackling the 
issue. Cartelisation reflected the protectionist instincts of the German society which 
did not place the same amount of trust in the “invisible hand of the market” as England 
traditionally did. the German industrial landscape would acquire a sense of stability 
and continuity as cartelisation discouraged mergers as a means of concentrating pro-
duction because the security afforded by cartels provided little incentive to acquire 
competitors.91 in England mergers and takeovers would be viewed as necessary to 
create synergies and enhance corporate and managerial efficiency. In Germany, this 
was viewed as a matter that had to be deal with within the corporate context by the 
shareholders of the company rather than by external forces such as a takeover. to 
that end the effective supervision of management was deemed not only as necessary 
but also as consistent with the nature and protective character of the German economy. 
this explains why it was unlikely that the Germany system of corporate governance 
could ever be merged with the widely different structurally, philosophically and insti-
tutionally uK system of corporate governance into a single system of governance.92 
the idea of introducing a us type board system namely was discussed by the 34th 
conference of Germany jurists in 1926,93 but it was rejected on the grounds that the 
dualistic system enabled shareholders to control the board quite effectively.
88 Katharine Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder/Shareholder Theory of Corporate Governance 7 hast-
ings Business Law Journal 351 (2011).
89 John E Wilson, British Business History, 1720-1994, 70 (Manchester university Press, 1995).
90 GR Carter, The Tendency Towards Industrial Combination, 8 (Constable, 1913). 
91 John E Wilson, British Business History, 1720-1994, 72 (Manchester university Press, 1995).
92 See: Lucian Bebchuck and Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership 
and Governance 52 stanford Law review 127 (2000).
93 Petri Mäntysaari, Comparative Corporate Governance, Shareholders as Rule-maker, 252 
(Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, 2005).
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In Germany, an important source of finance for companies in the post war era was 
the access to internally generated funds which rendered most of them relatively inde-
pendent of external sources of finance94 such as the stock market. a corporate land-
scape which is characterised by a dense network of companies closely related to each 
other and to the banking system95 provides fertile ground for the emergence of banks 
as a significant parameter of corporate governance. Germany has few listed companies 
compared with the uK.96 this is because the banks play a pivotal role in corporate 
governance as they have historically been the provider of capital to German enter-
prises. this is why many German companies have a shareholding basis which is 
concentrated among a few powerful shareholders who hold enough shares to control 
the company and prevent a takeover of the company from another company; the so-
called “blockholders”. Even the listed German companies are more dominated by 
blockholders than the companies in the uK.97 The most significant blockholders in 
German listed companies are families,98 banks, insurance companies or the govern-
ment itself with significant cross-shareholdings between industrial companies and 
bank groups.99 Mark Roe argued that “shareholder primacy could be inefficient when 
an industry is concentrated because the shareholders of a monopolist would gain part 
of the consumer surplus while according to macroeconomic theory another part of it 
would be completely lost to society”.100 that is also due to the prevailing approach 
towards property rights in Germany which differs from the respective in the UK.
as the role of the banks in the corporate context was enhanced, they were anchored 
in a relationship closely linked to each other; they guaranteed a place on the supervi-
sory board which granted them not only a monitoring role of the management but 
also an active role within the corporate institutional settings. They remained influen-
tial as they exercised depository voting rights on behalf of their clients; their role in 
“placing new securities and in lending with shares as collateral…ending up voting 
the shares of companies that used their underwriting services”101 gave rise to their 
proxy voting powers. German business experienced the separation between ownership 
94 J Esser, Bank Power in West Germany Revised 13 West European Politics 17 (1990). J Edwards 
and K Fischer, Banks, Finance and Investment in Germany, 228 (Cambridge university Press, 1994).
95 Stefan Beck, Frank Klobes, Christoph Scherrer, Surviving Globalisation?: Perspectives for the 
German Economic Model (springer, 2005).
96 Brian Cheffins, The Metamorphosis of “Germany Inc”: The Case of Executive Pay 49 american 
Journal of Comparative Law 497 (2001).
97 Parvez Raja Khurram, Comparative Corporate Governance: Germany, Japan and Pakistan in 
Context: The Beginning or the End of Corporate Law History? 28 international Company and Com-
mercial Law review 296 (2017).
98 Brian Cheffins, History and the Global Corporate Governance Revolution: The UK Perspective 
43 Business history review 90 (2001).
99 Mara Faccio, Larry HP Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations 65 
Journal of Financial Economics 365 (2002).
100 Mark J Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximisation Norm and Industrial Organisation 149 uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law review 2066 (2001). 
101 Randall Morck, A History of Corporate Governance Around the World, Family Business Groups 
to Professional Managers, 14 (the university of Chicago Press, 2007).
EBLR_30-6_1_inner.indd   894 26-9-2019   09:56:20
Marios Koutsias [2019] EBLR 895
and control in a much more moderate way than the uK, if at all. in contrast to the uK 
where the dispersion of shares to a larger number of actors entailed the loss of control 
on the part of the owners, in Germany a crucial element shifted the power back to 
ownership; the voting rights. Multiple-vote shares – shares that carried multiple vot-
ing rights with them- were quite common place at that period. “in the interwar years 
this instrument was used extensively and was usually justified as means of fighting 
dilution of family control…allowing founding families to keep their grip on the com-
pany … as the votes per share ranged 20 and 250 times higher than the normal voting 
right … these privileged shares were given to members of the supervisory board or 
to banks that committed themselves to vote according to the controlling group”.102 the 
power of the future shareholders was therefore restricted waning the effects of the 
dispersion of shares and along with it the side effects of the separation of ownership 
and control. today the issuing of such shares is not permitted. the emergence of 
banks as the primary source of capital within a tightly regulated environment forged 
their instrumental position within the German corporate edifice and fostered their 
links with companies.
The Employees Come On the (Dual) Board
the main conception of the company in Germany is a “thing in itself”.103 this concept 
formed the intellectual basis for the German co-determination model.104 it places the 
focus upon the company itself rather than a group within a company. therefore, by 
definition the shareholders’ interests do not enjoy a monopoly in the corporate agen-
da.105 there is room left for pursuing the interests of groups which are critical for the 
success of the company such as the creditors and the employees. in contrast to the 
uK law, the German company law embodies the stakeholder doctrine106 with a two-
tier board that distinguishes between management and supervisory boards and allows 
for employee participation in decision-making.107 since, the co-determination system 
requires labour participation at board level, “the norms of shareholder capitalism do 
102 Ibid., p262. 
103 Ewan McGaughey, The Codetermination Bargains: The History of German Corporate and 
Labour Law 23 The Columbia Journal of European Law 138 (2016).
104 Klaus J Hopt, Labour Representation on Corporate Boards: Impacts and Problems for Corpo-
rate Governance and Economic Integration in Europe 14 international review of Law and Economics 
203 (1994).
105 Christine A Mallin, Corporate Governance, 252 (Fifth Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2016).
106 Wolf George Ringe, Changing Law and Ownership Patterns in Germany: Corporate Governance 
and the Erosion of Deutschland AG in JG Hill and RS Thomas (eds), Research Handbook on Share-
holder Power, 404-438 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015).
107 Neil Fligstein, Jennifer Choo, Law and Corporate Governance 1 annual review Law social 
sciences 61 (2005).
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not automatically prevail over other stakeholders’ claims”.108 the German Corporate 
Governance Code clarifies the obligation of the Management Board and the Super-
visory Board to ensure the continued existence of the enterprise and its sustainable 
creation of value in conformity with the principles of the social market economy 
(interest of the enterprise).109
the enhanced institutional role for labour within many of Germany’s companies 
was for the first time articulated and introduced in public discourse during the nine-
teenth century by a Catholic theologian named Franz von Baader. It was viewed 
sympathetically as a means to act against the dispossession of labour in the industrial 
revolution.110 the need for capital was much bigger than at any point previously. the 
traditional elements of the financial system at the time comprised “agricultural credit 
institutions, government securities and short-term trading capital for international and 
interregional trade”.111 At that point “the majority of financial intermediaries were 
private banks. they executed a substantial share of the economy’s payments, linked 
savers with investment opportunities, and helped found new businesses”.112 By con-
trast, the uK resorted to the stock market to fund its own industrialisation. as early 
as in 1861 The German Commerce Code provided the first codification of company 
law including the public limited company.113 it established the two- tier system of 
corporate governance; of a management and a supervisory board. Both boards com-
prised of shareholders aiming at monitoring the management.114 the supervisory 
board replaced a system of control of the company by the then government.115 the 
government introduced the supervisory board aiming at serving the interests of stake-
holders too with emphasis on the interests of the employees too.116
During the Second World War, the Nazis –as it well documented- created an utterly 
totalitarian state that concentrated all layers of powers in its authoritarian structures. 
In Nazi Germany, the -already highly concentrated- industrial sector provided a fer-
tile ground for enhanced governmental control of its operations. the preparation for 
108 Parvez Raja Khurram, Comparative Corporate Governance: Germany, Japan and Pakistan in 
Context: The Beginning or the End of Corporate Law History? 28 international Company and Com-
mercial Law review 295, 296 (2017).
109 German Corporate Governance Code, Foreword 1, see it at: <https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/
councils/corporategovernance/reference/german.pdf> .
110 Ewan McGaughey, The Codetermination Bargains: The History of German Corporate and 
Labour Law 23 The Columbia Journal of European Law 138 (2016), page 146.
111 Richard Tilly, Germany 1815-1870 in rondo Cameron, Banking in the Early Stages of Industri-
alisation: A Study in Comparative Economic History, 154 (Oxford University Press, New York, 1967).
112 Caroline Fohlin, Finance Capitalism and Germany’s Rise to Industrial Power, 17 (Cambridge 
university Press, 2007).
113 Hartmut Schmidt, Drukarczyk Jocken, Dirk Honold, Stefan Prigge, Andreas Schüler, Gönke 
tetens, Corporate Governance in Germany, 34 (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1997).
114 Jean du Plessis, Otto Sandbrock, The Rise and Fall of Supervisory Codetermination in Germany, 
international Company and Commercial Law review 71 (2005). 
115 Mark Loewenstein, Stakeholder Protection in Germany and Japan: What Can We Learn from 
Foreign Systems? 76 tulane Law review 1675 (2002).
116 Klaus Hopt, The German Two-Tiered Board in Comparative Corporate Governance, 6 (oxford 
university Press, 1997).
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war led to the strengthening of linkages among companies through “the Nazi policy 
of enforced cartelisation”.117 in addition to that, the National socialist government 
left its stamp on the current model of corporate governance. in order to consolidate 
their grip on the country’s industrial sector, the regime introduced a fiduciary duty of 
directors towards stakeholders. While in today’s terms this sounds particularly stake-
holder-friendly and noble, the Reich included itself within the list of stakeholders.118 
While a more stakeholder-friendly approach is nowadays viewed as an element of 
corporate democracy, at this point it was exactly the opposite. it entailed an extension 
of the authoritarian hand of the Nazi state to the corporate sector establishing a direc-
torial duty to somehow comply or take into account the agenda of the Reich. Corpo-
rate complicity to many of the crimes of the Nazi regime –which do not form part of 
the article- could be viewed from this perspective too. the regime banned voting by 
mail, and forced shareholders who could not vote in person to register their holdings 
with banks and entrust banks with proxy voting rights. “this bestowed the large banks 
with voting control over much of the German large corporate sector. the reich then 
took control of the banks”.119 despite the irony inherent in this and irrespective of the 
utterly different agenda of the Reich, the stakeholder-oriented structure of German 
companies could be traced in this period too.
in the 1950s120 employees were granted the right of participation at the supervisory 
board level. the main impetus for supervisory codetermination by employees actually 
came when the British occupation authorities and German trade unionists were deter-
mined to ensure that the German nation should never fall into the dictatorial pattern 
of the Third Reich. The specific method invented was to “make it compulsory for 
labour and management to work together at the level of the supervisory board…to 
ensure that the very strict class distinction that existed in Germany would not emerge 
again”.121 the British believed that the incorporation of labour into the administrative 
structures of the German company would eliminate the possibility of a restive labour 
creating problems while it would ensure the administration of the German corporation 
on a more inclusive basis that would gradually wane the differences between the dif-
ferent components of the German society. it is interesting that at that point the uK 
viewed employee participation as a means to mitigate conflicts stemming from class 
and race distinction as well as a means to promote a more inclusive corporation that 
can evolve on a more consensual basis.
117 Ronald Dore, William Lazonick, Mary O’Sullivan, Varieties of Capitalism in the Twentieth 
Century, 15 oxford review of Economic Policy 107 (1999).
118 Randall K Morck, Lloyd Steier, The Global History Of Corporate Governance, An Introduction, 
9 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005), <http://www.nber.org/papers/w11062.pdf>.
119 Ibid.
120 Employee participation on the supervisory board was introduced basically by the Montan-Mitbest 
Act of 1951 and the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz of 1952 followed by the 1976 Mitbestimmungsgesetz act
121 Jean J Du Plessis, Bernhard Großfeld, Claus Luttermann, Ingo Saenger, Otto Sandrock, Matthias 
Casper, German Corporate Governance in International and European Context, 155 (second Edition, 
springer, 2012).
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The turmoil and the previous period of conflict led Germany to seek a ““middle 
way” between unbridled capitalism and socialism. Labour leaders “sought to be rep-
resented on the boards partly to convince the allies not to dismantle Germany’s coal 
and steel industry by asserting that labour would constrain the wartime industrialists 
via positions on the firm’s supervisory boards”.122 Mark roe suggests that the “ulti-
mate reason for the prevalence of social democracy may have been a history of war 
and turmoil during the first half of the 20th century in the core civil law countries”.123 
the place reserved for labour within the administrative structure of the German com-
pany serves as the red line that utterly separates the uK corporate governance model 
with the German one.
the whole concept of “parity employee representation at supervisory level was 
observed with great scepticism when in 1951 it was forced upon the German popula-
tion…there was hardly any other statute that had been met with so much rejection … 
by the legal profession in Germany as the Montan-MitbestG of 1951”.124 the reaction 
of management was rather one of “horrified outrage. It predicted that labour repre-
sentatives would come blundering into management affairs like a herd of bulls in a 
china shop”.125 German academia and business viewed it as an intervention external 
to the nature of corporate governance; it was effectively a means to prevent “revolu-
tionary employee techniques”.126 the 1976 Mitbestimmungsgesetz act was even 
brought before the Federal Constitutional Court127 by German companies and share-
holders. they alleged that the act in question was contrary to certain articles of the 
Basic Law; more specifically the participation of employees on the supervisory board 
was arguably against art. 14 paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Basic Law on property rights; 
this referred to the fact that employee participation was viewed as an infringement of 
the property rights held by shareholders. this was very close to the English percep-
tion of what a company is.
However, the Federal Constitutional Court adjudicated differently. The Mitbestim-
mungsgesetz act of 1976 was “neither a danger to collective bargaining nor did it 
prevent the normal functioning of enterprises. Since the final decision within the 
supervisory board still rested within the shareholder representatives the guarantee of 
private property was not violated”.128 therefore, the act was found constitutional and 
122 Mark Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance, Political Context, Corporate 
Impact, 29 and 30 (oxford university Press, 2006).
123 Mark Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets 120 harvard Law review 462 
(2006).
124 Jean J Du Plessis, Bernhard Großfeld, Claus Luttermann, Ingo Saenger, Otto Sandrock, Matthias 
Casper, German Corporate Governance in International and European Context, 164 (second Edition, 
springer, 2012).
125 Detlev F Vagts, Reforming the Modern Corporation: Perspectives from the German 80 harvard 
Law review 23, p68.
126 Thomas Raiser, The Theory of Enterprise Law in the Federal Republic of Germany, american 
Journal of Comparative Law 120 (1988).
127 German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfGE) volume 50, 290 (1979).
128 Manfred Weiss, Marlene Schmidt, Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Germany, 256 (Klu-
wer Law international, 2008).
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along with it the whole model of employee codetermination at the level of supervisory 
board was found to be compatible with the constitutional rights and traditions of the 
country. only three years after that ruling, the supreme Court in Civil Matters129 
upheld the previous decision of the Federal Constitutional Court and went one step 
ahead by adjudicating that the 1976 Mitbestimmungsgesetz act had been passed in 
the public interest. therefore, when the By-Laws of siemens aG were found to vio-
late the act, this “was found to be susceptible to constituting a ground to declare the 
provisions of the By Laws null and void”.130 the court recognised that the act in 
question “must be allotted special importance in context of the politics relating to 
corporations since it represents the result of fundamental decisions reached after years 
of confrontation…it stretches beyond the interests of the persons immediately affected 
by it…it does indeed serve the common weal of the community…it aims at the entire 
national economy”.131 this signals a shift in the approach on the part of the German 
legal world towards the Act. As Germany was reaping the benefits of stability and 
growth the initial reactions were fading and the act was becoming an integral part of 
the German society and a landmark of its corporate governance model.
Property Rights in Germany
the wording of the constitution of Germany – the Basic Law- underlines the philo-
sophical divergence between itself and the uK. article 14(2) of the Basic Law on 
“property, inheritance and expropriation” states that: “property entails obligations. 
its use shall also serve the public good”.132 While, the constitution clearly recognises 
a right to property as most constitutional texts in the West do, it sets certain limita-
tions to it. Property does indeed entail obligations; namely that its use should also 
serve the public good. this renders a limitation on any property right of the share-
holders on the company socially imperative and consistent with the constitutional 
definition of property rights. To that end the Aktiengesetz of 1937 contained the rule 
that “the two-tier system is not designed for the benefit of shareholders only. It is 
there also to protect the public interest and it is normal to say that members of the 
management board do not act in the interests of the shareholders only. By law, mem-
bers of the management board are expected and entitled to carry out their duties for 
the benefit of shareholders, employees and the society as a whole”.133 although, the 
current Aktiengesetz lacks a similar provision, it still “applies as a general uncodified 
129 German Federal Supreme Court in Civil Matters (BGHZ) volume 83, 106 (1982). 
130 Jean J Du Plessis, Bernhard Großfeld, Claus Luttermann, Ingo Saenger, Otto Sandrock, Matthias 
Casper, German Corporate Governance in International and European Context, 166 (second Edition, 
springer, 2012).
131 Ibid.
132 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Grundgesetz, <http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/
statutes/GG.htm#14>. 
133 Petri Mäntysaari, Comparative Corporate Governance, Shareholders as Rule-maker, 253 
(Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, 2005).
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principle”134 supported by the spirit of the Basic Law and the aforementioned provi-
sion. This would be reflected by the basic duty of the members of the board is the 
duty to act in the interests and for the benefit of the company in good faith.135 and 
although, this may sound similar to the respective British approach on directors’ 
duties the difference lays in the definition of the content of the “interests of the com-
pany”. In Germany, the definition would reflect the character of the company itself 
as a more inclusive legal entity, therefore the “interests of the company” would 
include “at a minimum the interests of the employees, the creditors and the 
shareholders”.136 in the uK, the “interests of the company” are the interests of the 
shareholders only137 despite the wording of section 172 of the Ca2006. therefore, 
the duty of a director to promote the “interests of the company” is interpreted in two 
very different ways in Germany and in the UK.
the concept of social codetermination “basically revolves around the idea of works 
councils (Betriebsräte) a system where ordinary workers are actively involved in 
structuring their day to day environment in personal and social matters”.138 the sys-
tem which has guaranteed an increased level of employee participation and the emer-
gence of labour as one of the actual parameters of corporate governance has historically 
evolved on the basis of cross party support. the enhanced employee participation was 
upheld by social democrats and Christian democrats alike guaranteeing the con-
tinuous support of the parties which formed the backbone of the governmental coali-
tions that ruled the country especially from the second World War and onwards and 
until today. Already “before the First World War, codetermination was developed by 
both liberal and Christian theorists as a process necessitated by industrialisation and 
as an acceptable alternative to revolutionary employee practices”.139 Cross party sup-
port brought with it the universality of its acceptance not only by business but cru-
cially enough by the society at large as a reflection of its “social economy model”. 
the latter rooted in “Catholic philosophy of social ethics…as well as Protestant eth-
ics…where distribution and the protection of the individual in a community were the 
focal point…the Church’s answer to the problem of the alienation of the worker in 
the nineteenth century was the strong source for the intellectual basis of the Christian 
democratic Party and the Christian social union in Bavaria. together with the 
 traditional orientation of the social democrats to workers as their prime voters … 
134 Ibid.
135 See Section 242 BGB (German Civil Code).
136 Andreas Cahn, Donald C David, Comparative Company Law, 335 (Cambridge university Press, 
2010).
137 Brady v. Brady [1988] BCLC 20, 40.
138 B Grossfeld, U Lehmann, Management Structures and Workers’ Codetermination in Germany 
with European Perspectives 1 Corporate Law development series 41 (1994).
139 Thomas Raiser, The Theory of Enterprise Law in the Federal Republic of Germany, american 
Journal of Comparative Law 117 (1988). 
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produced an orientation in which social elements and collective approaches gained 
importance”.140
Is the “European Company” truly European?
As it was explained at the first part of the article, the creation of a supranational cor-
porate form which would be immune to national legislation and would be subject 
exclusively to the Eu law was within the Eu policy agenda from its early steps. after 
all, the Eu operates the biggest single market in the world. it has harmonised to a 
significant extent several aspects of its single market facilitating and liberalising trade 
between its members to a very considerable extent. the single European company 
form would remove all regulatory as well as practical obstacles allowing every com-
pany or Eu national to engage in cross-border business activities and expand to 
another member state of the Eu without having to face a complex set of national rules. 
in simple words the introduction of a truly European Company would complement 
the single market.
However, due to the conflict between the UK and the German models of corporate 
governance, this was not the case. The EU negotiated the Fifth Directive141 on struc-
tures of public companies and employee participation. the negotiations lasted for 
several decades and they were marked by a corporate cultural war ending up with the 
directive becoming defunct. the Eu witnessed a collision between the uK corporate 
culture with the respective German one. the presence of employees at the board level142 
was pure anathema to the British side. The conflict between the one-tier board system 
of the uK and the two-tier system of Germany which guaranteed stakeholder par-
ticipation in the management of the company was so fierce that at the end it sank the 
Fifth Directive.143 the introduction of employee participation at board level with the 
establishment of a second supervisory board was too radical of a reform to be toler-
ated in the uK; therefore the proposed directive “faced strong opposition, notably by 
united Kingdom”.144 this is because such a reform entailed a vast cultural reform 
within the British company law. It would affect the role of stakeholders in the British 
company, it would challenge the absolute supremacy that shareholders enjoy within 
the British corporate context and it would undermine their property rights over the 
company. In simple words, the passing of the Fifth Directive did not just entail a 
140 Horst Siebert, The German Economy, Beyond the Social Market, 24-25 (Princeton university 
Press, 2005).
141 OJ (C 240) 2.
142 Otto Sandrock, Jean J Du Plessis, The German Corporate Governance Model in the Wake of 
Company Law Harmonisation in the European Union, Company Lawyer 91 (2005). 
143 Jean J Du Plessis, Janet Dine, The Fate of the Draft Fifth Directive on Company Law: Accom-
modation instead of Harmonisation, Journal of Business Law 23 (1997). 
144 Karol Linmondin, The European Company (Societas Europaea) – A Successful Harmonisation 
of Corporate Governance in the European Union? 15 Bond Law review: special issue: Comparative 
Corporate Governance 156 (2003).
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reform of the British company law but a fundamental re-thinking of the entire edifice 
of the British corporate culture. While “the original SE and Fifth Directive drafts may 
have been viable proposals in the original 6-member EEC, the uK opposed them most 
fervently”.145 this is why the “uK resistance against employee representation on 
boards”146 is cited in bibliography as one of the principal reasons for the failure of the 
Fifth Directive. There are genuine problems in radically reforming the dominant cor-
porate culture; this is a principle referred to in bibliography as path dependency.147 
When such a wide-reaching reform which challenges deeply rooted beliefs is viewed 
as forced from regulators external to a country’s institutions, it is usually doomed to 
fail. And it did. The Fifth Directive is a prominent monument in a virtual museum of 
defunct company law harmonisation initiatives. The Fifth Directive was consigned 
to history, but the Eu continued to pursue its aim to create a single pan-European 
company. to that end, a new round of negotiations to introduce the “European Com-
pany statute” or the “European Company” or the “societas Europea” (sE) started. 
the aim was identical; to create a supranational corporate form subject exclusively 
to Eu law.
the “European Company statute”148 was the follow-up effort to establish a Euro-
pean company on the basis of a common regulatory basis. it was supposed to be a 
new legal form for public companies governed by Eu law and separate from any 
national system. however, once again after many years of negotiations the Eu was 
nowhere close to that aim. the regulation on the sE was passed in 2001 after intense 
negotiations but it constituted a complex set of rules partially regulated by national 
legislation.149 The first ideas for a European Company150 and the first drafts of the SE 
regulation aimed at a complete Eu company law regime.151 the regulation for an sE 
145 Martin Gelter, EU Company Law Harmonization between Convergence and Varieties of Capitalism, 
Law Working Paper N° 355/2017 June 2017, ECGI Working Paper Series in Law, <https://poseidon01.ssrn.
com/delivery.php?id=9620080211270911231030280860310930051270320930880050921000940280 
701040690951200070781100240360051070001100200730721180700821260390720300020
070960951031030681121160190320380400740920720820231220721170131220040941260 
80105123007028020109026090105026006099&EXT=pdf> accessed on July 25th 2018. 
146 Ibid. at page 19. See also Janet Dine, Implications for the United Kingdom of the EC Fifth Direc-
tive, 38 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 547-559 (1989). Daniel T Murphy, The Amended 
Proposal for a Fifth Company Law Directive–Nihil Novum 7 Houston Journal of International Law 
215-235 (1984). J Temple Lang, The Fifth Directive on the Harmonization of Company Law 12 Com-
mon Market Law Review 345-368 (1975). Andrew Johnston, EC Regulation of Corporate Governance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge university Press 2009), steven schneebaum, The Company Law Harmonization 
Program of the European Community Law 14 and Policy in international Business 293-334 (1982).
147 John Quinn, German Codetermination and Ireland’s Convergence 37 Company Lawyer 331 
(2016).
148 Regulation on the Statute for a European Company (SE) EC 2157/2001.
149 Carl Svernlov, Fanny Petersson, The Future of European Company Forms 26 international Com-
pany and Commercial Law review 171 (2015).
150 Mathias Siems., The Impact of the European Company (SE) on Legal Culture 30 European Law 
review 437 (2005).
151 Vanessa Edwards, The European Company – Essential Tool or Eviscerated Dream 40 Common 
Market Law review 443 (2003). 
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was but a “shadow of its former self”.152 What was supposed to be a single European 
company –a Societas Europea- ended up being “as many different types of SEs as 
member states of the Eu”153 as several aspects of the sE (such as capital and minimum 
capital requirements and modifications related to shares and securities issued by an 
sE and employment and tax law issues)154 were governed by the respective company 
laws of the member states. the statute’s board and governance provisions are enabling 
rather than mandatory and reflect the “panoply of corporate law principles and 
traditions”155 which is dominant across Europe. the member states basically agreed 
that they disagree. instead of a common European Company whose institutional 
structure and constitutional arrangements would be common across the Eu, the 
regulation recognised that a common Eu corporate governance model could not 
accommodate the significant divergence among its member states. The European 
company would be treated in every member state as if it were a public limited com-
pany formed in accordance with the law of the member state in which it has its reg-
istered office. The most important consequence of the existence of this plurality of 
sources of law which involve both Eu and national law instruments is the fact that 
the SEs constituted throughout the EU may be treated differently in the various mem-
ber states.156 That defies the whole raison d’être of the regulation in question. To 
conceal insurmountable conflicts among member states, crucial aspects of the SE 
were left for national laws to regulate. the governance of the sE in particular, is 
shaped to a great extent by widely different national laws rendering the vision of a 
“truly autonomous, supranational form of organisation a sham”.157 such is the variety 
of national laws applicable to the sE that it is probably correct to say that there are 
28 regimes in 28 member states for the sE.158 the failure of the European Company 
to take off was a by-effect of the “social objective”159 it was assigned by the Commis-
sion to achieve. it was considered that the sE must be a “vector for social advance”160 
allowing employee participation on the board.
152 Paul L Davies, Workers on the Board of the European Company?32 Industrial Law Journal 77 
(2003).
153 Carl Svernlov, Fanny Petersson, The Future of European Company Forms 26 international Com-
pany and Commercial Law review 171 (2015).
154 Eric Morgan De Rivery, Claire Stockford, The European Company 6 international Business 
Law Journal 717 (2001).
155 Theo Raaijmakers, The Statute for a European Company: Its Impact on Board Structures and 
Corporate Governance in the European Union 5 European Business organisation Law review 160 
(2004).
156 Marios Bouloukos, The Legal Status of the European Company (SE): Towards a European 
Company “A La Carte”? 4 International Business Law Journal 506 (2004).
157 Tobias H Troger, Choice of Jurisdiction In European Corporate Law – Perspectives of European 
Corporate Governance 6 European Business organisation Law review 57 (2005).
158 Frank Wooldridge, The European Company, The Successful Conclusion of Protracted Negotia-
tions 25 Company Lawyer 127 (2004).
159 Nicole Stolowy, Does the “Societas Europea” or “European Company” Make a Significant 
Contribution to Construction of a European Company Law?, Journal of Business Law 363 (2012).
160 Ibid.
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the Eu approved a directive on employee participation161 which by definition 
grants to the member states the necessary discretion when introducing its provisions 
into their internal national legal orders. taking into account that the otherwise “Euro-
pean” company now includes corporate forms based on either a single or a dual board 
model, the scope for discretion was indeed enormous. therefore, the uK retained its 
support of absolute shareholder supremacy with the shareholders as the holders of a 
property right over the corporation. Germany maintained its distinctive co-determi-
nation system which recognises an effectively managerial role to stakeholders in an 
inclusive corporate form. National governments addressed the challenges of globali-
sation in their own distinctive ways. Cultural, institutional and other national differ-
ences constrained any push to convergence.162 decades of successful operation of the 
co-determination system in Germany’s “participatory model of corporate governance”,163 
which effectively granted a semi-managerial role to employees has become a part of 
the “German psyche and become a virtual habit”164 to the degree that the country can-
not give it away. the resilience of national company law is a by-product of divergent 
national models of capitalism each of which corresponds to local conditions where 
“interacting institutions complement each other”.165 the problem lies exactly at this 
point; that the countries which comprise the Eu could not agree on what is a company, 
who is the company and for which purpose a company shall be run.166 the debates in 
question evidently involve the most fundamental aspects of company law, and there-
fore undermined the creation of a common body of European company law from the 
very beginning.
harmonisation and convergence of laws and standards are inherent in the func-
tional identity of the single market as well as the nature of the Eu as a whole. it is 
built on a notion of consensus and mutual concessions. therefore, it is interesting that 
even within an institutional framework whose very raison d’être is legislative con-
vergence, corporate governance emerged as perhaps one of the very few areas that 
resisted the forces of harmonisation.167 therefore, the development of European com-
pany law has proved that “uniformity is impossible and that national differences 
161 Directive 2001/86/EC supplementing the Statute for a European Company with regard to the 
involvement of employees.
162 Manfred Weiss, Convergence and.or Divergence in Labour Law Systems?: A European Perspec-
tive 28 Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal 486 (2007).
163 Peter Koslowski, The Ethics of Corporate Governance: A Continental European Perspective 51 
International Journal of Law and Management 29 (2009).
164 Angela Richard, Mitbestimmung: The Future of Co-determination in a Hostile World 15 debatte, 
346 (2007).
165 Daniel Komo, Charlotte Villiers, Are Trends in European Company Law Threatening Industrial 
Democracy?, European Law review 179 (2009).
166 Janet Dine and Marios Koutsias, The Nature of Corporate Governance: The Significance of 
National Cultural Identity (Edward Elgar, 2013).
167 Janet Dine, Marios Koutsias, and Michael Blecher, Company Law in the New Europe: The EU 
Aquis, Comparative Methodology and Model Law (Edward Elgar, 2007).
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remain prominent”.168 The end result of the harmonisation efforts of the EU in this 
field is indeed a variety of company law and corporate governance systems among 
the member states.169 European company law still lacks the legislative act that puts in 
place a truly “supranational form of company”.170
Brexit means No Right to Vote for Future EU Company Laws
as it is well known and documented by now, the British electorate voted to leave the 
EU on 23 June 2016. Despite the fact that the referendum was not legally binding, 
leaving the Eu was politically imperative. the uK Prime Minister, theresa May, has 
rather famously stated that “Brexit means Brexit”.171 this phrase was marked by a 
great level of obscurity since its very inception but the possible avenues that Brexit 
may take are indeed more concrete than the PM herself perhaps realised at that point. 
it is not the purpose of this article to analyse the multiple dimensions of Brexit which 
is by definition an issue of colossal importance for the UK and its legal order. The 
article would focus on the ability of the post-exit UK to influence the legislative 
mechanism of the Eu. in all possible scenarios –except of course the rather unlikely 
case that the uK decides to indeed remain in the Eu- the uK would lose its vote in 
the Council and its MEPs in the European Parliament and therefore, it would not be 
in the position to vote for Eu law. the uK as one of the three biggest member states 
of the Eu had considerable voting power in both institutions and the ability to forge 
alliances to promote its distinctive national interests. it left its imprint on the Eu law. 
there is no better example of that than Eu company law. as it was explained thor-
oughly in this article, the Union’s fifty year old efforts to introduce a single-entity 
European Company ended up in failure due to stiff –but effective- resistance on the 
part of the uK.
the British Prime Minister has argued for “the freest and most frictionless trade 
possible in goods and services between the uK and the Eu”.172 the potential avenues 
which can be followed after Brexit are fivefold; namely the UK remaining in the 
European Economic area,173 which involves membership of the most important 
168 Daniel Komo, Charlotte Villiers, Are Trends in European Company Law Threatening Industrial 
Democracy?, European Law review 179, 182 (2009).
169 Ibid.
170 Wolfgang Schon, The Concept of the Shareholder in European Company Law, in European 
Business organisation Law review 10 (2000).
171 Gerard McCormack, Hamish Anderson, Brexit and its Implication for Restructuring and Corpo-
rate Insolvency in the UK, Journal of Business Law 533 (2017).
172 The United Kingdom’s exit from and new Partnership with the European Union, White Paper, 
2 February 2017.
173 The EEA is an agreement applying to the EU member states and the EFTA states (Norway, Ice-
land, and Liechtenstein) except Switzerland. Switzerland is a member of EFTA, but it is not a member 
of the EEa. the EEa members get access to the union’s single market and they apply the single Mar-
ket rules. The EEA agreement does not covers matters such as agriculture, fisheries, taxation, common 
trade and foreign policy and a customs union.
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aspects of the internal market, or the uK remaining only in the customs union like 
Turkey, or creating a complicated web of bilateral agreements like Switzerland does, 
or to sign a free trade agreement (FTA) like Canada which covers mostly the trade in 
goods or to fully extricate itself from the Eu and to trade with it on the basis of the 
Wto rules. None, of these possible options involves the ability of the uK to remain 
a part of the legislative procedure of the union and to remain a rule-maker instead of 
an Eu-standard bearer. the EEa entails the free movement of persons -albeit with 
restrictions linked to “serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties”-174 
which was anathema to the Brexit side and arguably the most “reviled aspects of Eu 
membership for uK referendum voters in the Leave camp”.175 it is also subject to the 
jurisdiction of the EFTA Court which follows the CJEU’s precedent.176
the British government has at the moment decided to leave not only the Eu but 
also its single Market and the Customs union,177 therefore pursuing a so-called “hard 
Brexit”. that rules out remaining a member of the EEa and it paves the way for either 
an FTA or a WTO-based agreement. Even as a member of the EEA, the UK would 
have “no vote on future changes to the applicable rules”178 including Eu Company 
Law. The UK would have no say in the post-Brexit efforts to re-introduce the Euro-
pean Company. Even if the uK remains within the EEa, which is the closest possible 
relationship with the Eu while not forming part of its membership,179 the uK would 
be subject to the entire fundamental “rules and regulations of the market, as is Norway 
and iceland, although without any say in their future content”.180 that is of particular 
importance for Eu company law. the departure of the uK from the Eu would remove 
the one pillar of the debate. irrespective, of the post-Brexit relationship of the uK 
with the union, the right to vote in the Council and in the EP would be lost. the 
departure of the champion of contractualism and shareholder dominance from the 
Eu, would probably lead to the emergence of the stakeholder model as the dominant 
force within the Eu corporate landscape. that should be embodied by a new Eu-wide 
European Company.
174 EEA Agreement, Art. 112. Agreement on the European Economic Area [1994] OJ L1.
175 Anne McGregor and Adam Kidane, Post-Brexit Scenarios for UK Competition Policy and Public 
Enforcement: The EEA Model v. Complete Independence 22(4) International Trade Law & Regulation 
82 (2016).
176 Maziar Peihani, Brexit and Financial Services: A Tentative Analysis of Possible Exit Scenarios, 
Journal of Business Law 366 (2017).
177 Richard Tauwhare, Brexit: Achieving Near-Frictionless Trade 23(3) International Trade Law & 
regulation 89 (2017).
178 Sue Arrowsmith, The Implications of Brexit for Public Procurement Law And Policy in the 
United Kingdom, Public Procurement Law review 6 (2017).
179 Aoife Coll, The EFTA Court’s Role in Strengthening the Homogeneity Objective of the EEA 
Agreement: An Examination in light of Brexit, International Trade Law & Regulation 119 (2016).
180 Christopher Clement-Davies, “Brexit Means Brexit”? But What Does That Mean …?, interna-
tional Energy Law review 159 (2016).
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Conclusion
the article explained the role of culture within the context of company law. Company 
law is not immune in its making; it is a by-product of the society within which it is 
developed. The article argued that in the last fifty years the EU has been effectively 
marred by a cultural war between a contractual view of the company and the stake-
holder approach. the two main pillars of this battle were the uK and Germany. the 
former defended fervently its contractual model of corporate governance which is 
marked by shareholder supremacy and by a definition of the company as a private 
affair between its shareholders. Germany on the other hand rallied around its own 
stakeholder-oriented model whereby the company is not devoid of social consider-
ations and has incorporated stakeholders at the highest level of its corporate gover-
nance. The cultural and philosophical as well as economic and societal differences 
which constituted the roots of such a divergence could not be compromised. they 
undermined the efforts of the EU to create a European Company which would be 
subject to a single body of law. in this sense the single market has been left incom-
plete. a common corporate form – a European Company- is essential to establish 
legal clarity in cross-border investment and facilitate corporate expansion across the 
European union. investors would need to look only at a single piece of Eu law in 
order to set up a company in another member state of the Eu instead of a patchwork 
of complex national pieces of legislation as it is the case now. This is truly significant 
if not pivotal for the smooth operation of the single market as well as for its comple-
tion. However, after decades of conflict the EU ended up with a compromise which 
did not fulfil its initial aim; the European Company did not harmonise standards across 
the union. it is “European” only by name. the article argues that Brexit is a game-
changer. the departure of the most important pillar of contractualism in the Eu would 
leave the union with member states which mostly adhere to the stakeholder model 
in one or another way. The ideologically driven conflicts of the past would not be 
repeated. Brexit may finally deliver something that was thought as inconceivable only 
a few years ago; a truly inclusive and a truly “European Company”. a company based 
on regulation common for all members of the European union.
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